International Quota Transfer and Intermediate Goods by Aldanondo, Ana Maria & Puertolas, Javier
 
 





















Paper prepared for presentation at the X
th EAAE Congress 
‘Exploring Diversity in the European Agri-Food System’, 






Copyright 2002by Ana-María Aldanondo and Javier Puertolas. All rights reserved. 
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any 
























      Ana-María  Aldanondo 
      Departamento  de  Gestión  de  Empresas 
Universidad Pública de Navarra 
Arrosadía s/n 
31006 Pamplona- Spain 




      Departamento  de  Economía 
Universidad Pública de Navarra 
Arrosadía s/n 
31006 Pamplona- Spain 
Phone: 34 948 169 355 










*This research has been sponsored by “La Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología”, Spain 
Government.    1
 
 















In this paper we use a general equilibrium model to examine the effects of international 
quota transfer when a quota restricts world commodity production whilst the trade in an 
intermediate good is not regulated.  The analysis shows that, when the quota regime is 
not internationally transferable, intermediate input trade substitutes for final good trade.  
In these circumstances, the distortions are lower than expected.  International quota 
transfer increases world welfare proportionally to quota rent gap.  Welfare distribution 
is also conditioned by commodity terms of trade and, particularly, by the outcome of the 
intermediate good price. 
 
 



















Production quotas in European Union agriculture are normally transferable between 
firms within the frontiers of each country, whilst there are practically fixed and not 
transferable between the different EU Member States.   
 
Economic literature has frequently underlined the dead weight loss that an individually 
non-transferable quota imposes as compared to the effects of a transferable system 
(Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993, a; 1995). This is the case because, in an industry under a 
regime of individually transferable permits, the exchange of licenses between units of 
production with different marginal costs or productive structures permits efficiency 
gains until the marginal costs of all the units become equal (Burrel, 1989). This 
diagnosis can be repeated in the framework of international trade.  When a global quota 
is distributed amongst different economies, the international transfer of licences can 
imply a world gain in welfare, independent of the way in which this gain is distributed.  
The international transfer of permits will allow for the production of the regulated good 
to be reallocated from countries that have a higher opportunity cost to those where this 
is lower, up to the point where the marginal rate of transformation is the same in all the 
countries.  In this sense, Burau et al., (1997) have shown that the current allocation of 
the EU sugar production quota to the different Member States implies an excess burden, 
as compared to a distribution that is more in accord with comparative advantages. That 
is precisely what would result if the free transfer of permits were allowed between 
countries. 
 
Nevertheless, agricultural markets may be vertically related and the existence of an 
intermediate good, which is an input for the production rationed good, could change the 
definitive impact of the quota on trade and welfare. For example, when we consider the 
integration of milk and animal feed markets in the EU; milk production is restricted by a 
quota while cereals and other animal feed are not or are less restricted. It is no casualty 
that since 1986, the year of the integration if Spain in the European Community, trade 
creation on animal feed vegetables has been much more important that trades creation 
on milk and derivatives (Aguilar, 2001).    
 
Several authors (Lariviere and Meilke, 1999; Zhu, Cox and Chavas, 1999; Machemache 
and Réquillard, 2000) have analysed international markets in which domestic 
production of an agricultural intermediate input was restricted by a quota; while the 
final processed good was not restricted. They consider fixed proportions technology. 
We will explore theoretically the other case: the impact of a final goods production 
quota on welfare intermediate goods trades. And, we allow for factor substitution.  
 
We use a general equilibrium model in order to analyse the effects on trade and welfare 
of the international quota transfer.  We consider a market in which the production of a 
final good is restricted by a global quota for the different countries, whilst the market 
for an intermediate good, which is the input of the final good, is not subject to 
intervention.  Earlier studies on export subsidies have already shown how the existence 
of an intermediate good modifies the expected effects of this policy (Paarlberg, 1995; 
Desquilbert and Guyomard, 1998).  In our case, the underlying intuition is that the 
intermediate good trade tends to substitute for that in the final good regulated by quotas. 
Furthermore, that the change of the commodity terms of trade exerts an influence over   3
the distribution of the welfare gains generated by the transfer of quotas between two 
countries 
 
We extend the virtual price model (Neary and Roberts, 1980; Tobin, 1952; Fulginiti and 
Perrin, 1993,b; Squires and Kirkley, 1996) to international trade in order to allow for 
supply functions and equilibrium conditions. Quota restrictions are simulated by a 
production tax cum lump sum subsidy (Parry, 1999). As regards intermediate good 
supply, we differ from the literature devoted to effective protection or subsidies (Ethier, 
1972; Jones, 1972; Sanyal and Jones, 1982; Spencer and Jones, 1992; Woodland, 1977), 
by analysing the net output of the intermediate good, rather than the gross output (Dixit 
and Norman, 1980). 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  In Section 1 we present the model.  
Section 2 is dedicated to an analysis of the effect of international quota transfer.  Section 
3 closes the paper with a review of the main conclusions.  Mathematical calculations 
have been relegated to two Appendices. 
 
1.  THE MODEL 
 
The specification of the general equilibrium model uses standard dual techniques (Dixit 
and Norman, 1980; Wong, 1995).  We consider two countries, where country 1 is the 
domestic country and country 2 is the foreign one.  The economy is made up of three 
goods: the numeraire, Xo, a final good, X1,  and an intermediate good, X2, used 
exclusively as an input in the production of good X1.  All three goods are tradables.  The 
numeraire and the final goods are substitutes in consumption and all the goods are 
substitutes in production
1.  World production of good X1 is restricted by a global quota, 
Q that is distributed between the two countries, in amount q
1 for the domestic economy 
and q
2 for the foreign one.  The primary production factors of the country, represented 
by the vector Z
i 
  (i=1,2), are not tradables and remain invariable.  
 
As regards the supply side, production is carried out with the same technology, namely 
constant scale technology, in the two countries and under conditions of perfect 
competition.  As a result, the profits of the firms are null. 
 
The quota, q
i restricts supply, thereby generating an unitary quota rent equal to t
 i. 
Furthermore, we assume that within each country the quota is individually transferable 
between firms and, therefore, that the quota rent is the same for all the domestic firms.  
The quota rent t
 i is specific for each economy and depends on the following variables: 
the actual size of the production quota of the country, q
i, the price of the final good, P1, 
and the price of the other goods, P2; that is to say,  t
 i = t
 i (q
 i, P1, P2). 
 
National Income in an economy subject to quotas can be represented by a Restricted 
Gross Domestic Product function (R-GDP), G 
c,i , which depends on quota, commodity 
prices and production factors.  Applying the virtual price framework, we could have a 
                                                 
1 That is to say, the demand for good i increases as Pj rises, there is Non- Jointness in production and the 
intermediate good is a normal input.  Under these conditions, the global gross substitutability of world 
excess demand is guaranteed, a sufficient condition for the stability of a competitive market (Takayama, 
1993). 
   4
virtual production tax cum lump sum subsidy
2 equivalent to quota q
i (Fulginiti and 
Perrin, 1993,b; Perry, 1999).  This levies the supply price of the product with a tax 
equal to the quota rent, t
 i, and compensates them with a lump sum subsidy equal to π
 i = 
t
 i q
 i.  Thus, under this regime the National Income of country i is specified using two 
components.  The first is a Non-Restricted Gross Domestic Product function
3 (NR-
GDP), G 
v,i, that will be maximised for a quantity of production of good one equal to 
quota, q
i , when the market price, P1, is reduced in a tax,  t
 i.  The second takes the form 
of a lump sum subsidy equal to total quota rent. 
 
In the case where the quota is transferred between the countries to a level, ξ  both the 
virtual tax and the subsidy will also be affected by this transfer.  When economy i  




v,i (1, P1 - t
 i, P2 , Z
i ) + (q
 i + ξ
 i  ) t
 i – r ∗ ξ
 i ;  i = 1,2    (1) 
 
where G 
v,i is an NR-GDP function that represents the maximum value of the GDP that 
country  i  can reach with the production factors endowment Z
i and the international 
prices of the goods, except that of the good subject to quota, whose price is equal to the 
market price less the virtual tax.  In reality, P1 - t
 i  is the virtual price for which the 
quota will maximise the NR-GDP function.  The second component is the virtual lump 
sum subsidy, which is equal to total quota rent.  Finally, we include the payment for the 
quota transferred internationally from one country to another, which is equal to the 
amount transferred, ξ
 i multiplied by the international price of the quota, r.  We consider 
that the size of the quota of each country, q
 i  the amount of quota transferred 
internationally, ξ
 i and the price of the transferred quota, r are determined politically and 
are independent of the decisions of the agents in the model. 
 
For its part, the behaviour of the representative consumer of each economy is given by 
the expenditure function: 
 
E
i (1, P1, U
i ) ;    i =1,2       (2) 
where 1 is the price of the numeraire, X0, P1 is the relative price of good,  X1  and U
i is 
the utility of the sole representative consumer of each economy  i.  The intermediate 
good, X2, is not consumed. 
 
With these two expressions we can represent the budget equilibrium condition for each 
country, as well as the commodity market clearing conditions. 
 
For each country the budget equilibrium condition implies that national expenditure has 
to be equal to national income.  Therefore: 
 
E
i (1, P1, U
i ) = G 
v, i (1, P1 - t
 i, P2 , Z
i ) + (q
 i + ξ
i ) t
 i – r ∗ ξ
i ;    i = 1,2      (3) 
                                                 
2 See Parry (1999) for a similar treatment. 
3 In the vicinity of equilibrium there is a relationship between the restricted and the non-restricted GDP 
function which, following Fulginiti and Perrin (1993,b), is reflected in Appendix A.  This relationship is 
used to determine the function and slopes of the restricted supply, as well as the sign of the Hessian in 
comparative statics, on the basis of the NR-GDP function in Appendix B. 
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2 ;  ξ 
1= -ξ 
2 = ξ                      (4) 
 
Finally, we specify commodity market equilibrium conditions, that of the good subject 
to quotas and that of the intermediate good.  Under Walras’ Law, one market clearing 
condition is redundant and, therefore, we only specify the equilibrium market conditions 
of the goods X1 and X2.  According to envelope theorem, the first partial derivative with 
respect to each price (and which is indicated with the corresponding sub-index) of the 
expenditure function is the compensated demand of the corresponding good. 
 
Thus, in the market for the good regulated by quotas the equilibrium condition is: 
 
E1
1 (1, P1, U 
1) + E1
2 (1, P1, U 
2) – Q = 0    (5) 
 
The demand of the two countries has to be equal to the world quota of good 1.  In other 
words, the world excess demand has to be null and the imports M
i
1 of one country equal 





1 = - (E1
2- q
2) ≡ - M1
2                             (6) 
 
As good X2 is an exclusively intermediate good, by Hotellings lemma the first partial 
derivative with respect to the price P2  of the NR-GDP (see Appendix B and Dixit and 
Norman, 1980) is the netput (gross production of intermediate good minus input 
demand by the final good sector). That is to say, this industry has a negative supply in 
country  i  under the assumption that the input is imported, or a positive one when it 
coincides with the exports (given that what is not used in the domestic production of 
good X1  is exported or, when there is a deficit of this input in the economy, it is 
imported). In this way, it holds that: 
 
G2 
v, 1 (1, P1 - t
 1, P2 , Z
1 ) + G2 
v, 2 (1, P1 - t
 2, P2 , Z
2 ) = 0    (7) 
 





In summary, once the quota of each country has been fixed, the excess of demand for 
good 1 will depend exclusively on consumption.  Conversely, the excess of demand of 
intermediate good 2 is determined exclusively in the production realm. 
 
2.  COMPARATIVE STATIC 
 
Let us now consider that the factor endowment of the economy is maintained constant 
and that the international quota transfer varies in a differential, dξ starting from a null 
initial transfer level.  We assume that both the resource endowment and the international 
price of the quota remain constant.  In our model, specialisation is incomplete and the 
domestic economy has comparative advantages in the production of the final good that 
is subject to quota, as well as in the intermediate good; it is a net exporter for these two 
goods  (M1
1 < 0; R2
v,1 > 0)  and suffers a more restrictive regulation than the foreign 
market.  Therefore, the quota rent in the domestic economy is superior to that of the   6
foreign economy.  From this, we have that there is an economy that demands a quota 
and a foreign market that transfers it, with the international price of the transferred 
quota being between the quote rent of the two countries.  Under these assumptions, the 
system of comparative static equations is obtained differentiating those of equilibrium, 
with the result being the following system of equations: 
 
M1
i dP1 + Eu
i dU = G2
v,i dP2 + (t
i-r) dξ 
i













v,1 ) dP2 - G2,1
v,1(G1,1
v,1) 






v,2 ) dP2+ G2,1
v,2(G1,1
v,2) 
-1 dξ= 0             (10) 
            
 
The first equation (8) corresponds to the maintenance of the budget equilibrium 
condition in each country: the expenditure differential has to be equal to the income 
differential following the quota transfer.  Equations (9) and (10) simply indicate that the 
differential of the excess of world demand has to be zero in the markets for the two 
goods.  In the case of the excess of world demand for the intermediate good (10), the 
same is expressed by using the NR-GDP function in accordance with the 
correspondences established in Appendix B. 
 
Considering that the derivative of the compensated demand with respect to the utility is 
equal to the derivative of the demand with respect to the income, y multiplied by the 
partial derivative of the expenditure function with respect to the utility (Dixit and 
Norman, 1980), that is to say, E1,u
i= C1,y
i Eu
i , we can solve the system of equations in 
order to analyse how the international quota transfer affects the prices of the goods, the 
welfare of the different countries and the volume of trade. 
 
The first result refers to the world gain in welfare generated by the quota transfer, which 







1-  t 
2) dξ              (11)     
  
Its interpretation is the expected one, namely that by transferring the quota of one 
country to another in which the production of the restricted good has a higher quota rent 
(lower opportunity costs), the gain in world welfare is directly proportional to the 
difference in quote rents (or opportunity costs). This is a result similar to the effects of 
transferring capital between two countries (Wuong, 1994). However, quota rents in our 
particular case depend on the price of the final good, P1 the price of the intermediate 
good, P2 and on the quota, qi (Appendix, B). And, it is important to understand if under a 
quota regime, trade of he intermediate good could narrow or widen the rent gap and, 
therefore, could diminish or increase the quota dead weight loss. Then the performance 
of the intermediate good and its effect on opportunity costs is decisive to understand the 
quota impact on welfare when there is an intermediate input. This effect will be 
explained below, in parallel with the analysis of the distribution of welfare gains and the 




i in equation (8), we can see the distribution of welfare gains between the 
two countries. Welfare improvement in each country depends, on the one hand, on the 
difference between the particular quota rent and the international price of the transfer 





i  = ( t 
i – r) dξ 
i- M1 
i dP1+ G2 
v,i dP2          (12) 
 
Therefore, let us first analyse the effect of the quota transfer on the price of the two 
goods, namely on that of the intermediate input and on that of the regulated final good.  
This comes indicated by the following equations: 
 
(14)                    
(13)              
) ) ( ( ) ) ( (
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The response of the price of the intermediate good to quota transfer (13) is expressed in 
function of the components of the Hessian of the R-GDP and the NR-GDP functions 
(Appendix B). Considering the R-GDP function, the price variation depends on the 
difference between the two countries marginal change in intermediate good net-supply 
due to a change in final good production, divided by the price derivative of the world 
market excess supply for the intermediate good. According to the equivalence between 
the R-GDP and NR- GDP Hessians, and by the convexity of the GDP function, the 
denominator of this expression is positive. Then, the sign of the variation of the price 
depends on how the net supply of the intermediate good changes in the two countries 
when transferring the quota and, particularly, on variations of intermediate input 
demand in the final sector. If the intermediate good is a normal input, the country that 
acquires quota will decrease its net supply of the intermediate good, and viceversa. The 
definitive outcome of the price depends on current differences in intermediate input 
intensity between the two countries.  
 
Intuitively, we could guess the possible sign of the price variation. If the country that 
releases the quota does not have comparative advantages in both the final and the 
intermediate good, it would be a high consumer of the intermediate input.  In fact, the 
two countries have different quota rents and, therefore, face a different virtual price P1-t, 
with this being higher in the foreign country.  Considering the concavity of the 
production functions, it could be thought that in that country the production would be 
more intermediate input intensive
4. Thus, it would free a greater quantity of the 
                                                 
4 Furthermore, in an economy with three goods, in accordance with the homogeneity condition of degree 
zero with respect to the supply prices of a good, it holds that:  G1,1
v (P1 – t)+ G1,2
v P2+ G1,0
v = 0.  
Similarly, by the symmetry condition of the GDP function, it holds that: G1,2
v = G2,1
v.  In this case,                                8
intermediate good by transferring quota than the domestic country would demand by 
acquiring it and, as a consequence, the price will fall. 
 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to determine a priori the sign of this variation. We try to 
discover it by using the NR-GDP function (see Appendix B).  As the denominator is 
positive in (13) under the convexity condition with respect to the prices of the NR-GDP 
function, the sign of the variation in the price again depends exclusively on the 
numerator. In principle, the sign of the variation in price, P2 is positive if, and only if, it 
















p . The fulfilment of this condition depends on the sign of the third 
derivatives of the NR-GDP function which are, in general, ambiguous (Desquilbet and 
Guyomard, 1998; Feenstra, 1985, Wong, 1995). Therefore, this question remains 
undetermined if the production technology is not specified and, indeed, represents one 
of the limitations of this generic dual approach. 
 
As regards the regulated final good, as in the case under study, the world quota, Q, will 
not change.  The variation in prices is solved in the integrated market exclusively in the 
demand ambit. If the demand of the good restricted by quotas is income independent,  
the price will not be affected by the quota transfer. On the contrary, it would depend on 
welfare distribution and on the income elasticity of demand.  
 
Indeed, the sign of the denominator in (14) is always negative, in that this is the 
derivative of the compensated demand with respect to the price itself.  Furthermore, in 
this framework, if X1 is a normal good, C1,y > 0, the variation in the price is positive, 
always provided that the two countries have a gain in welfare, or that the country that 
has a gain in welfare also has a high demand elasticity of income. Distribution of 
welfare is affected by changing terms of trade. Therefore, the variation in the price of 
the good restricted by quotas will ultimately depend on how the price of the 
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The denominator in (15) is derivative with respect to the price of the excess of world 
demand for good 1. It will be negative because we have assumed substitutability in 
consumption and production (Dixit and Norman, 1980; Takayama, 1993). For its part, if 
the good is normal, then the first two terms of the sum between brackets are also 







,2)  is positive and sufficient high. If the outcome of the 
intermediate good price prejudices the domestic economy and if in this economy good 1 
is a luxury, then it could eventually happen that the price of good 1 collapses. 

















2 , 1 −
−
− =  Therefore, with the rest being equal, the relationship being considered will 
tend to be greater in absolute value in the country that cedes the quota. 
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As a consequence, the participation of each country in the welfare gains caused by the 
quota transfer will depend exclusively on the international distribution of the quota rent 
and on the price change in the intermediate good market. Therefore, as we have 
assumed that the domestic market is an exporter of the intermediate good and of the 
non-numeraire final good subjected to quota, a decline of the intermediate good price 
would deteriorate, directly and through the transmission to the final product price, its 
commodity terms of trade. In the most extreme case, the quota transfer could prejudice 
the domestic economy.  
 
In summary, a quota transfer would be of no interest to a country if, as a consequence, it 
loses a prosperous market for an intermediate input abroad. At least, the model suggests 
that the benefit of the transfer could be reduced by a worsening of the commodity terms 
of trade.  
 
Finally, let us analyse whether the quota transfer creates trade in the two sectors, that is 
to say, in that of the intermediate good and in that of the regulated good.  As the 
equilibrium condition is satisfied in the two markets, it is sufficient to analyse how the 
exports of the domestic economy will vary with the transfer.  The equations are as 
follows: 
 
(17)              ) ( ) ( 1
(16)     
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The first equation (16) shows us how the exports of the intermediate good of the 
domestic economy change when receiving an international quota transfer of the final 
good. This change depends on the net supply variation of the intermediate good in that 
economy.  Using the components of the Hessian of the NR-GDP function (see 
Appendix B), the result is clear, namely that the quota transfer restricts intermediate 
good trade.  Effectively, if the intermediate and final goods are substitutes in 
production, the sign of 
v G 1 , 2  is negative while, given the convexity of the NR-GDP 
function, all the other components of the function are positive. This outcome is logical: 
if a net exporter country of an intermediate good increase the production of the final 
good at the expense of a net importer country of the intermediate input, then the exports 
of the intermediate input would shrink.  
 
This result is important and represents an advance with respect to the analysis of quota 
systems in partial equilibrium. We say this because it demonstrates that if world   10
production of a good is restricted by a non transferable quota, the trade in any 
intermediate input tends to substitute for that of the final good restricted by quota.  In 
summary, there is more trade in the intermediate good under a regime of quotas that are 
not transferable internationally than under one of transferable quotas. 
 
As we have seen earlier, the effect that this development in intermediate good trade has 
on its own price and on the price of the other factors is not completely defined.   
However, if logically the price of the intermediate good increases it will tend to lower 
the price of the primary production factors in country 2 (Sanyal and Jones, 1982). The 
net effect could be a lowering of the opportunity cost of the final good in country 2. 
Then trade of the intermediate input will alleviate the dead weight loss of the non 
transferable production quotas. At the same time, it will benefit the country that is a net 
exporter of the intermediate good and prejudice the country which is the net importer of 
intermediate good (Tribedy, Belodi and Biswas, 1982).  
 
Finally, in equation (17) the variation of the exports of the good regulated by quotas is 
equal to the increase in production, which is the transferred quota, less the net variation 
in the demand for the good in the domestic economy. In the expression, ε
1 and
 ε
2 are the 
import price elasticity of good 1 in the domestic and foreign economies, respectively. 
The second component of expression (17) suggests the following. First, there is an 
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y . Second, this rise in demand would push up the price. Third, 
the price rise would diminish exports to a greater extent when the relative price 






) is greater. Therefore, the second 
component of this expression is negative and is made-up of the income effect of 
demand in the domestic economy, multiplied by the relative price elasticity of the 
demand for imports in the foreign country.  The third component affects the demand of 
the foreign economy, and is symmetric and of the opposite sign to that of the domestic 
economy.  
 
Of course, in the circumstances where the demand for the good regulated by quotas was 
income independent in both countries, then the exports of the domestic country would 
enjoy an increase exactly equal to that of the transferred quota.  Therefore, the regime 
would be impeding the development of trade in the regulated good, although this effect 
is partially compensated by the intermediate good trade.   
 
 
3.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have used a dual general equilibrium model with two countries and 
three goods, namely two final goods and one intermediate good which is the input in the 
industry of the final non-numeraire good.  Using this model, we have examined the 
impact of an international quota transfer in a world market in which the production of 
the final non-numeraire good is restricted at world level to a fixed quantity, Q.  In our 
case, the domestic country that receives the quota transfer is also a net exporter of the 
two goods, i.e. that subject to quota and the intermediate good. 
   11
The international quota transfer generates welfare gains that are directly proportional to 
the quota rent gap between the country that receives the quota and that which cedes it.  
The distribution of these gains between the two countries is also affected by changes in 
the commodity terms of trade.  In this sense, the effect of the quota transfer over the 
price of the intermediate good is ambiguous and depends on the variation in the net 
supply of that good in the two countries.  This question remains undetermined if the 
production technology in the different sectors and the factor endowment of each 
economy are not specified in a primal model and, indeed, represents one of the 
limitations of this work. 
 
Furthermore, the price of the final good is insensitive to the quota transfer if the 
consumption of that good is independent of the income.  In the contrary case, the 
increase in world income will tend to cause the price of this good to rise in the 
circumstances where both countries obtain welfare gains by way of this transfer, and 
always provided that we are dealing with a normal good. 
 
Finally, we have made clear that the trade in the intermediate good tends to substitute 
for that in the final good in a world market subject to production quotas that are not 
internationally transferable.  The development of this trade can affect both the dead 
weight loss caused by a rigid regime of production quotas, as well as the distribution of 
welfare between the different countries.   
 
The development of intermediate good trade could lead to an increase in its price. In 
these circumstances, it is obvious that the increase in the exports of the intermediate 
good and the increase in its price will benefit countries that enjoy greater comparative 
advantages in the production of the whole sector, intermediate and final good. This is so 
because, despite these countries apparently emerging in a more prejudiced state 
following the coming into force of a non transferable quota regime, because it prevents 
them from increasing their exports of the final good. By contrast, the worsening of 
commodity terms of trade will prejudice the country that is a net importer of both 
goods.  
 
If the increase in the intermediate input price induces a convergence of the opportunity 
costs of the final good, this would imply an improvement in world welfare, albeit at the 
cost of a welfare loss in that country. 
 
In summary, the immediate consequence of the application of a regime of quotas that 
are not transferable internationally is that it jeopardises gains in trade.  Nevertheless, if 
this sector has a tradable intermediate input, then the trade in this intermediate good 
tends to substitute for that in the final good.  In these circumstances, it could happen 
that the development of trade in the intermediate good would reduce the excess burden 
caused by a rigid international regime of production quotas, although at the cost of 




According to Fulginiti and Perrin (1993,b) and Perry (1999), there is equivalence 
between the restricted and the unrestricted GDP function in the vicinity of the 
constrained equilibrium. This is expressed as follows: 
   12
G
 c(P0 , P1 , P2 , q ,Z)= G
 v(P0 , P1-t , P2 , Z)+  t∗ q 
 
and shows that the GDP at world prices restricted with a production quota, q, in sector 1 
is equal to the GDP at taxed prices of the restricted good plus a lump sum subsidy, t*q.  
Therefore, P1-t will be the virtual price at which the optimum production of X1 will 
coincide with the quota q.  The quota rent, t, is equal to the international price of the 
regulated good, P1, less the virtual price of the regulated good.  Thus, the quota rent 
depends on P1, on the size of the quota of the country itself, q, on the price of the good 
not subjected to restriction, P2, and on the variation in the factor endowment Z.  We 

























As the quota rent is equal to the market price subjected to restriction P1, less the shadow 








The derivatives of the NR-GDP function with respect to the different prices, under 
Hotellings lemma, constitute the supply of each product.  In our case, the derivative of 
the NR-GDP function with respect to the virtual price (price of good 1 minus the quota 













v(P0 ,  P1 - t, P2 , Z) = G
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In summary, the derivative of the NR-GDP function with respect to the virtual price, 
P
v
= P1 – t, is equal to the quota, q.  By contrast, as the variation of the rent, t, is equal to 
the inverse of the variation of the virtual price, the partial derivative of the NR-GDP 
function is equal to minus the quota, -q.  Finally, if the quantity restriction is binding, 
then the supply is insensitive to autonomous variations in the price P1. 
 
The NR-GDP function, as a profit function, is homogenous of first degree with respect 
to the non restricted good market prices and the virtual price, P1- t. Accordingly, it is 
easy to demonstrate that the R-GDP function is homogenous of first degree in prices P0, 
P1 and P3. Thus, always provided that we express the rent as a rent relative to the price 





In equations (7) and (8), the supply of exports of the netput  X2 of each country is 
expressed as the partial derivative with respect to the price P2 of the NR-GDP function.  
This expression is deduced from a correspondence between the first derivatives of the 
restricted and unrestricted GDP function, which are expressed in the following way:   13
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c(1, P1 , P2 , q , Z) = G
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∗ q =X2 
 
That is to say, the netput of good X2, which is not subject to restriction, is equal to the 





v(1, P1 – t, P2 , Z)=X2 
 
In equation (10) we can derive the components of the differential of the supply of X2 in 
a restricted regime in function of that in a unrestricted regime. Thus: 
 
dX2 ≡ d G2 
c= G2,2 
c dP2+ G2,q 















It remains to establish both the signs of the derivatives of the quota rent  t  with respect 
to the price of the unrestricted good, as well as the quota.  These are obtained by 
establishing a correspondence between the components of the restricted and unrestricted 
Hessian. 
 
On the one hand, it holds that the quota rent is equal to the derivative of the R-GDP 
function with respect to the amount of the quota. 
 
Gq 
c(1, P1 , P2 , q , Z) = - G
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As the NR-GDP function is convex with respect to the prices (as are all profit 
functions), it holds that the quota rent falls as the quota increases. 
 
Equally, we obtain the derivative of the quota rent with respect to the price of the 
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If we consider that the two goods, the intermediate and the final, are net substitutes in 
the production, we can conclude that the quota rent tends to decrease with the price of 
good 2, which is a logical result. 
 
Thus, we can express the differential of good X2 as a function of the components of the 
Hessian of the NR-GDP function: 
 
dX2 ≡ dG2 
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